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1. Introduction 
 
Two fundamental functions of government are to mitigate fluctuations in economic 
activity (stabilization) and to reduce inequality of opportunities and outcomes among 
individuals and families (redistribution). In unitary states these functions are performed 
by one order of government, although program delivery may be decentralized. In 
federations, both federal and regional (states or provinces) governments perform these 
functions. Moreover, federations usually incorporate inter-governmental fiscal relations 
to address regional differences in size, resource endowments, economic performance, 
and fiscal capacity.  
The fiscal relationship between federal and sub-national governments raises 
three main equity issues. First, does the federal fiscal system reduce regional economic 
disparities (regional development and interregional redistribution)? Second, does it 
restore a reasonable balance between the revenue-raising powers and spending 
responsibilities of the federal government and the regional governments combined 
(vertical fiscal balance)? Third, does it reduce fiscal disparities among regions 
(horizontal fiscal balance)?  
This paper addresses primarily the first question. The change in the relative 
economic position of different regions due to federal fiscal activity may be called 
interregional redistribution. It differs from income redistribution because it compares 
average income levels among regions rather than income levels among individuals, 
regardless of their place of residence. While the two concepts are related – a province 
with a larger share of low income residents will likely have a lower average income – 
they address different issues within a federation. 
All items in the federal revenue structure can potentially generate interregional 
redistribution. Federal spending comprises two major groups: (a) programs delivered 
directly by the federal government (federal programs) and (b) joint programs delivered 
by regional governments but partly financed by the federal government through 
conditional or unconditional grants. Both components may generate interregional 
redistribution. 
 To measure interregional redistribution economists compute net fiscal flows 
(the difference between what the residents of a region gain from federal government 
direct spending and intergovernmental transfers and what they contribute to the federal 
coffers). They also use selected indices of interregional redistribution to facilitate 
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comparisons over time within a country, or international comparisons for a given year. 
Some of the measurement issues arising from the calculation of regional fiscal flows 
and indices of interregional redistribution are evaluated in this paper.  
The study of interregional redistribution requires four major steps. The first step 
develops the methodological tools for calculating net fiscal flows (Section II). The 
second step develops the economic concept for the analysis of interregional 
redistribution (Section III). Section IV presents various indices of interregional 
redistribution. The fourth step - interpreting the estimated indices - is performed in 
Section V. The final section contains some concluding remarks and some suggestions 
for further research. 
 
2. The calculation of net regional fiscal flows 
 
The calculation of net fiscal flows requires separate allocations for the following 
elements of the federal fiscal system: (a) the regional allocation of federal revenues, (b) 
the regional distribution of federal grants, and (c) the regional distribution of direct 
federal spending, which comprises (i) purchases of goods and services, (ii) transfers to 
persons and business, and (iii) interest on the public debt.  
Before discussing the approaches to the interregional allocation of federal 
revenues and expenditures, it is necessary to address some general methodological 
issues. First, interregional redistribution strictly interpreted involves shifts of fiscal 
resources among regions through the intermediation of the federal fiscal system. 
Therefore, the analysis should be confined to a country’s residents only. This means that 
federal taxes borne by non-residents and payments to non-residents should be excluded 
from the calculations. Second, tax structures incorporate tax bases, statutory rates, and 
special tax preferences and spending programs delivered by the tax system (tax 
expenditures). Recorded data on federal revenues are net of the effects of tax 
preferences and tax expenditures. Because net fiscal flows are calculated as the 
difference between federal revenues and expenditures assigned to a region, these 
balances remain unaffected if tax expenditures are treated as spending items or as 
negative taxes. The official data incorporate the specific approach to the regional 
distribution of tax preferences and tax expenditures used by the agency that makes the 
allocation. A more consistent, but time consuming, approach would allocate the gross 
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There is no universally accepted approach to the measurement of federal fiscal flows. 
Three different approaches have been often used in empirical studies: (a) cash-flow; (b) 
benefit; and (c) economic gain.  
The cash-flow approach focuses on the location where revenues are collected 
and disbursements are made. It has more of an administrative than an economic 
foundation because federal flows are measured according to record keeping procedures. 
This feature makes the cash-flow approach the preferred option by statistical agencies. 
As it is often applied, this approach has two main short-comings. Its regional allocation 
of federal revenues may have little connection with the burden that is borne by the 
residents of a region. Also, its focus on the way expenditures are recorded sometimes 
leads to inconsistent approaches. For example, in Canada’s provincial economic 
accounts, the allocation of federal payments for wages and salaries is based on the place 
of employment, reflecting the location where factor income is generated. Federal 
purchases of other goods and services, however, are allocated where these items are 
consumed.  
The benefit approach focuses on the residence of the individuals who receive the 
benefits of government services and make contributions to their financing. It is a direct 
extension of fiscal incidence, adding the residence dimension to the analysis. The 
contributions of a region to the federal coffers and its gains from federal spending are 
the aggregation of the contributions made and benefits received by the residents of that 
region. Being directly linked to fiscal incidence analysis, this approach presents the 
same measurement difficulties in the allocation of government purchases of goods and 
services. Since the focal point is the individual, the comparison among regions and the 
interpretation of the federal fiscal flows under the benefit approach is based on 
consumption rather than income. This means that estimates of the degree of 
interregional redistribution based on this approach are interpreted from a welfare 
perspective. 
A third approach has recently been proposed by Ruggeri and Yu (2000). Called 
the economic gain approach, it contains elements of the cash-flow and benefit 
approaches, but focuses directly on jurisdictions. Its conceptual foundation is the 
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recognition that interregional redistribution deals with the economic position of 
different regions in a country, therefore, measures of this type of redistribution should 
be linked directly to jurisdictions, not individuals. Moreover, the comparison of regional 
economic conditions is based on income rather than consumption, a feature more 
consistent with the way regional economic disparities are measured and analyzed.  
The economic gain approach avoids some of the measurement issues associated 
with the other two approaches. It assigns federal revenues to the agents whose economic 
activity adds to the tax bases in a region. Thus, it measures the contribution that a region 
makes to the federal coffers through the tax revenues generated collectively by its 
residents. It allocates federal purchases of goods and services by the economic gains 
received by a region, measured by the factor income generated in that region by  federal 
spending. By focusing on the economic activity in a region, the economic gain approach 
bypasses the issues of how to allocate different types of public goods (pure public 
goods, impure public goods, etc.). 
 
 Allocation methodology 
While these three approaches differ in terms of the conceptual foundations and the  
method of measuring federal fiscal balances, large shares of federal revenues and 
expenditures would be allocated in the same manner under each of the these approaches. 
The specific allocation under each approach is discussed below. 
 
Federal revenues 
Although revenue structures differ among countries, there are sufficient similarities to 
allow for a general approach to the regional allocation of federal revenues. First, a 
distinction is made between tax and non-tax revenues. The latter usually include five 
items: (a) royalties, (b) investment income, (c) fines and penalties, (d) sales of goods 
and services and (e) miscellaneous non-tax revenues. Tax revenues may be grouped into 
four major categories. Income taxes include taxes on individual income and on 
corporate profits. Payroll taxes are taxes on wages and salaries levied usually on both 
employers and employees for Social Insurance Contributions (old age pensions and 
unemployment insurance) and for health care insurance. Real property taxes include 
taxes levied on immovable property owned by individuals and businesses and capital 
taxes paid by corporations. Taxes on goods and services may be direct (on the 
consumer) or indirect (on the producer). They may be broad based (general sales taxes) 
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or product specific (excise taxes, custom duties), and they may include the remitted 
profits of government enterprises. They also include a variety of fees and charges, such 
as motor vehicles fees and licenses.  
To evaluate different approaches to the measurement of federal fiscal balances, 
we may divide federal revenues into: (a) revenues that are not shifted and (b) revenues 
subject to shifting. For the first category, the person who pays the tax is also the person 
who bears the full burden of the tax. In this case, the location of the tax payment (cash-
flow approach) is the same as the place where the economic activity expands the tax 
bases (economic gain approach) and the tax burden is borne (benefit approach). 
Therefore, all three approaches would yield the same results.  
 
Taxes not subject to shifting 
The items in this category are determined with reference to tax incidence analysis. They 
include: (i) personal income taxes, (ii) direct taxes on consumers, and (iii) payroll taxes 
imposed on employees. 
Personal income taxes. In tax or fiscal incidence studies, personal income taxes 
are commonly allocated to individual taxpayers on the basis of their residence. This 
approach assumes that the person who pays the tax is also the person who bears its 
burden. Although recent studies suggest that personal income taxes may be subject to 
some degree of shifting due primarily to (a) tax-induced migration (Bingley and Lanot 
2002), (b) bargaining based on after-tax wages (Lookwood and Manning 1993), and (c) 
human capital decisions also based on after-tax income (Montmarquette 1974), in my 
view, the assumption of no shifting remains valid in the case of interregional 
redistribution. Even when such shifting may occur, it is likely to be confined within a 
region. 
Payroll taxes. There are various categories of payroll taxes. Payroll taxes may be 
imposed on employers and/or employees. We may separate (a) payroll taxes that have 
direct linkages to the financing of benefits they provide (taxes that finance specific 
social insurance programs) from (b) general payroll taxes with no connection to the 
benefits provided to those who pay them.  
Payroll taxes on employees with direct benefit linkages are similar to a price for 
a service rather than a tax, and their inclusion in tax incidence studies is questionable. 
Their inclusion is more justifiable for interregional redistribution because the benefits 
may not be matched precisely by the contributions, thus creating winners and losers on 
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the basis of residence. Moreover, the residence of a person who paid the tax may not be 
the same residence at the time of receiving the benefits. General payroll taxes on 
employees are equivalent to the portion of the personal income tax levied on labour, and 
are generally allocated to the workers who pay them based on the location of 
employment.  
The potential for shifting exists for general payroll taxes on employers. 
Empirical evidence indicates that, over the long-run, the burden of these taxes is largely 
shifted back to labour, an assumption commonly used in tax incidence studies 
(Kesselman 1997). This assumption is even move valid for employer payroll taxes 
linked to the benefits they finance. In competitive labour markets, when employees 
realize that the payment is directly linked to the benefit, labour supply and demand 
curves will shift by the same degree and the tax is borne entirely by them. This means 
that the three approaches to the measurement of federal fiscal balances yield the same 
results for both employer and employee payroll taxes.  
For the analysis of interregional redistribution, we must recognize that these 
taxes and their benefits (when identifiable) should be included in the calculation and 
that both taxes and benefits should be assigned to those who pay them and who receive 
the cash payments. 
Consumption taxes. These taxes may have a broad base (national value-added 
taxes) or a narrow base (excise taxes and custom duties). They may be levied on 
consumers or producers, thus providing some opportunities for tax-shifting. 
For direct taxes on consumers, either broad-based or excises, the standard 
incidence assumption is based on the “uses” side of household budgets, implying that 
their burden is borne by consumers in proportion to their total consumption (broad-
based taxes) or their consumption of the taxed goods and services. Browning (1978) 
argued that, since these taxes affect the consumer price index and since most 
government transfer payments are indexed for inflation, recipients of government 
transfers are automatically compensated for this tax. Its burden, therefore, falls on factor 
income. Ruggeri (1993)  showed that this change in incidence is not very convincing 
because there are sources of income other than transfers that respond to price increases 
automatically (for example, investment income and wages with escalator clauses) or 
through negotiations. Thus, at most one may adjust for the portion of transfers that are 
fully indexed for inflation. Within the framework of interregional redistribution, this 
potential adjustment to the standard incidence approach would affect the results only to 
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the extent that it differed substantially across regions. The case for using the standard 
assumption for interregional redistribution may be even stronger for excise taxes 
because the taxed goods are more likely to be used in the region where they were 
purchased than overall purchases. Therefore, the revenues collected by the federal 
government from these taxes can be allocated among regions in proportion to general 
consumption expenditures in the case of broad-based taxes and the consumption of 
specific goods and services for excise taxes. Thus, for direct consumption taxes, all 
three approaches to the measurement of federal balances are likely to yield the same 
results. 
Real property taxes on owner-occupied residences. These taxes are generally 
levied by local governments and their incidence has little relevance for studies of 
interregional redistribution, which focus on federal fiscal flows. Nonetheless, it may be 
useful to briefly summarize their treatment in tax incidence analysis. 
Three components of real property taxes are subject to taxation: land, structures, 
and permanently installed equipment. This tax is imposed on owner-occupied 
residential structures, rented residential structures, and non-residential structures. For 
the first category, the occupant is the owner of the land and the structure and the 
consumer of the residential services. Therefore, he/she bears the full burden of the tax 
under any incidence assumption or approach to the measurement of federal fiscal 
balances.  
 
Taxes subject to shifting 
Three main categories of taxes are subject to shifting: (i) corporate income and capital 
taxes, (ii) indirect consumption taxes, and (iii) real property taxes other than those on 
owner-occupied residential structures. 
Corporate income taxes. Under the cash-flow approach, corporate income taxes 
are allocated among regions on the basis of negotiated formulas which include the 
location of the head office, the wages paid and other relevant information. Under the 
benefit approach, the regional allocation of these revenues requires a number of steps 
because of the potential interregional shifting of tax liabilities. First, we must deduct the 
portion paid by non-residents. Then we must determine who bears the burden of 
corporate taxes based on tax incidence studies (Auerbach 2005; Gravelle 1994; Gravelle 
and Smetters 2006; Harberger 1962, 2006; Judd 2006; Randolph 2006).  
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These studies suggest that the incidence of corporate income taxes is different 
for a closed economy than for an open economy with perfect mobility of capital. In the 
first case there is no possibility of tax exporting among countries and the tax must be 
borne by domestic consumers and/or factors of production. Theoretical models, starting 
with Harberger (1962) suggest that in a closed economy the corporate income tax is 
borne by all owners of capital (recipients of interest, dividends, rents and capital gains) 
and this approach is used in some studies of tax incidence (US Congressional Budget 
Office 2001; Vermaeten, Gillespie and Vermaeten 1994). Since the federal corporate 
income tax is applied uniformly across the country, it would be borne by the owners of 
capital by region in proportion to their shares of capital income. Additional regional 
effects may be generated if there are special interactions between federal and provincial 
tax systems that facilitate tax exporting among regions. In open economies there is the 
possibility of tax exporting and the incidence of corporate income taxes is affected by a 
variety of economic factors. In general, we may distinguish between an average world 
corporate tax rate and the differential rate in each country. With respect to the average 
rate, the world becomes the closed economy and the associated closed economy 
incidence conclusions remain valid. For the differential country rate, with perfect capital 
mobility this component is borne largely by domestic labour. In calculating federal 
fiscal balances, one may use a compromise approach by allocating the tax in part to 
domestic consumption, in part to capital and in part to labour. Similar conclusions apply 
to taxes on corporate capital.   
Although the economic gain approach focuses on the activities that generate the 
tax bases in a region instead of the tax burden imposed on that region, the results of tax 
incidence analysis are relevant also for this approach. First, the tax revenue  that would 
be imputed to non-residents as suppliers of capital should be excluded from the 
measurement of interregional redistribution. Second, the tax that would be imputed to 
the domestic suppliers of capital should be allocated on the basis of their residence, 
which would be approximated by the regional distribution of capital income. Third, any 
portion of corporate income taxes that is shifted forward should be allocated to the 
region where the agents contribute to this tax through their spending, approximated by 
the regional distribution of consumption. Finally, the portion of this tax that is shifted 
backward to labour should also be included in the distribution of revenues because it 
affects the economic position of a region (lower labour income) and its fiscal capacity. 
9
Thus, the same compromise suggested for the benefit approach may be applied also to 
the economic gain approach.   
Indirect consumption taxes. Some consumption taxes are levied on producers 
and sellers, thus generating some shifting. For firms producing tradable goods and 
services, these taxes may be shifted backward to labour if capital is perfectly mobile and 
both exporters and import-competing firms are price takers. For producers of non-
tradable goods and services, there is the possibility of forward shifting to consumers. 
Under the cash-flow approach, the issue of shifting is irrelevant. Under both the benefit 
and economic gain approach,  these taxes raise similar issues as corporate income taxes 
and how their burden is allocated among regions depends on the assumptions about 
their degree of forward and backward shifting. 
Real property taxes. Economists agree that the burden of the tax on land is borne 
by landowners due to its immobility. For structures, there are two conflicting views. The 
traditional view assumes capital mobility and immobility of renters and owner-
occupiers, and market power by the owners of commercial and industrial properties. In 
this case, taxes on structures are borne by owner occupants, owner-operators and 
renters, and consumers in general. The new view assumes that workers and consumers 
are more mobile than structures, therefore, the tax cannot be borne by consumers or 
wage earners, and its incidence falls entirely on the owners of capital. Thus, the 
incidence of the property tax is more like the incidence of a corporate income tax than 
an excise tax. In tax incidence studies, the real property tax is usually broken down into 
its components  (residential, commercial and industrial) and each component is assigned 
different incidence assumptions, which sometimes reflect a compromise between these 
two views (Ruggeri, Van Wart, Howard 1994; Vermaeten, Gillespie, Vermaeten 1994).    
Under the cash-flow approach, the revenue from this tax would be allocated to the 
region where the tax is collected. Under the other two approaches, the possibility of tax 
shifting of the portion imposed on non-residential structures would allow for the 
distribution of the tax burden to residents of other regions. 
 
Non-tax revenues 
Non-tax revenues include: (i) royalties from natural resources, (ii) remittances from 
government enterprises, (iii), other investment income, and (iv) sale of goods and 
services. These revenues usually represent a small share of total federal government 
revenues, but raise a number of conceptual and measurement issues. 
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Royalties are the price charged for selling natural resources to private sector 
agents. In the cash-flow approach, they would be assigned to the region where the 
resource transaction takes place. However, these resources are usually traded in a world 
market where their prices are set internationally. Often they face a price inelastic 
demand. In this case, these royalties are mostly passed on to consumers and can be 
treated as excise taxes. Any excess of the domestic royalty over the average world 
royalty would be borne by domestic labour.  
The cash-flow approach would assign the revenue from these royalties to the 
region where they are collected (the region where production takes place). Under the 
benefit approach, if we assume full forward shifting and if details of the sources of these 
royalties are known, their revenue can be allocated on the basis of a region’s 
consumption of the good on which the royalty was levied. If the federal government 
collects royalties from a variety of natural resources and data are available only for their 
aggregate values, regional shares of total consumption expenditures may be used 
instead. A similar allocation would be used under the economic gain approach because 
the tax base would be generated by the consumers of the goods on which the royalty is 
imposed.  
Remittances from government enterprises are similar in nature to corporate 
profits generated by government-owned businesses and taxed at a rate of 100 percent. 
However, there are no shareholders to whom the burden of this implicit tax can be 
shifted. The entire revenue arises from an excess of the price over the average cost (net 
of the corporate tax paid). Therefore, this revenue may be treated as an excise tax and 
may be allocated in the same manner as royalties.  
Other investment income comprises largely interest payments on loans and 
investments and is the flip side of interest on the public debt. Its revenue is neither from 
taxation nor from the sale of a publicly-provided good or service. Yet it is part of the 
federal government’s general revenue used to finance spending programs. Since it 
would be allocated in the same manner under all three approaches to the measurement 
of federal balances, and since generally it is not large in amount, one may allocate it 
among regions in accordance with the regional distribution of interest income, or use the 
data published by government statistical agencies when available. 
Sales of goods and services generate revenues in exchange for government 
provided goods and services, in a manner similar to a private business. In theory, these 
transactions should be excluded from federal fiscal balances. However, for currently-
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produced goods and services, the cost of providing them is already included in the 
federal government expenditures and distributed among regions in unknown manner. 
The allocation of revenues and expenditures for this item would not be the same under 
the three approaches to federal balances. Under the benefit approach, the benefit and 
payment would be treated as a simultaneous transaction. In this case, one can neutralize 
this item by excluding it from the calculations of federal balances on the revenue side 
and then subtracting its regional distribution found in government publication from the 
expenditure side. The cash-flow approach in theory would assign the revenues to the 
location of consumption or use and the expenditures to the location of production. In 
practice, it is likely that both revenues and expenditures would be assigned to the 
location of consumption, yielding the same result as the benefit approach. The economic 
gain approach would differ only in the case of goods for which the place of 
consumption may not be the same as the place of production. 
 
Expenditures 
Six components of federal government expenditures may be identified: (i) transfers to 
persons, (ii) transfers to business, (iii) transfers to other governments, (iv) interest on the 
public debt, (v) fixed investment, and (vi) current purchases of goods and services. 
Similar to revenues, a large portion of federal expenditures would be allocated in 
the same manner under all three approaches to federal balances. The recipients of 
federal transfers to persons are the beneficiaries of those transfers and are identifiable 
by place of residence. The governments receiving federal transfers are identifiable by 
jurisdiction, and are expected to spend these funds to provide benefits to their residents.  
Transfers to business may be viewed as negative taxes and may be allocated in 
the same manner as corporate income taxes. Their regional allocation would be the 
same for the benefit and economic gain approach, which would follow the principles of 
tax incidence. The cash-flow approach would allocate these transfers on the basis of the 
location of the receiving business.  
For fixed investment and current purchases of goods and services, the three 
approaches to federal balances may yield different allocations. For these two items, 
there are greater similarities between the cash-flow and the economic gain approach. 
Under the cash-flow or the economic gain approach, federal current purchases 
of goods and services may be divided into a wage and a non-wage component. Under 
both approaches, wages would be allocated to the region where the source of 
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employment is located, as is done for personal income taxes, which reflect an 
employee’s place of residence. Occasionally, as in the case of Ottawa (Ontario) and 
Hull (Quebec), the two allocations are inconsistent when the employee works in one 
region and resides in another region. 
The allocation differs between cash-flow and economic gain approaches for the 
non-wage component of federal current purchases. The former approach may not use a 
consistent application to this item. Relying largely on records of transactions and 
government recording practices, it may assign the federal spending to the region where 
the agency to which the spending is assigned in the budgetary process is located. When 
the production and consumption of the goods and services takes place in the same 
region, there is no inconsistency because the consumption-based allocation is the same 
as the allocation based on the place where income is generated. When the place of 
consumption is different than the place of production, the cash-flow approach yields a 
different result than the economic gain approach.    
The economic gain approach provides a consistent method for allocating the 
non-wage spending. If the salary of a federal civil servant residing in a certain region is 
viewed as an economic contribution to that region, the same treatment should be given 
to the payment for the services of a consultant who resides in the same region. In 
practice, detailed information on the residence of those who provide services to the 
federal government is not available; therefore, one has to resort to an approximation. 
Since the focus is on payments to factors of production, one may allocate non-wage 
federal spending in proportion to a region’s private sector factor income. 
Under the benefit approach, this spending component would be allocated on the 
basis of which region benefits from the goods and services produced by these 
employees. The benefit approach follows strictly the distribution principles used in 
expenditure incidence analysis (Ruggeri 2005), which generally divides the purchases 
of goods and services into two categories. The first category includes federal spending 
for programs for which the beneficiaries may be identified. It includes goods and 
services that could be delivered by the private sector, but are directly provided or 
financed by the government, either because they generate large positive externalities or 
to fulfill some chosen equity principles. The main examples of these “private” goods 
and services are publicly funded health care and education. The second category 
contains federal spending for programs that do not allow the identification of 
beneficiaries. It includes goods and services that would not be provided by the private 
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sector because it would not be possible to sell them separately to individual purchasers. 
Examples of these “public” goods and services are national defence and other protection 
of persons and property, including the justice system, and general government. 
For “private” goods and services, the three approaches to federal fiscal balances 
may yield similar results. Let us consider education and assume that the federal 
government is responsible for its funding over the entire country, but these programs are 
delivered at the local level. In this case, most of the expenditures would be made in the 
same region where the benefits would be received. The only portion of federal 
education spending that would involve different allocations under the three approaches 
would be the salaries of a federal department of education located in the national 
capital.  
The only category of federal spending with a marked difference among the three 
approaches to federal balances is the one that includes “public” goods and services.  
Empirical studies on fiscal redistribution generally use two methods for allocating these 
goods and services: (a) on an equal per capital basis, or (b) on the basis of some concept 
of income. The first method is consistent with the treatment of general expenditures as 
pure public goods indivisible in consumption. The second method is consistent with a 
principle of insurance where people with higher income receive greater benefits because 
they have greater assets that are protected by government expenditures. The differences 
in the regional allocation of general expenditures among the three approaches may be 
reduced by a finer disaggregation that may help identify beneficiaries on a regional 
basis. 
Similar differences among the three approaches exist for federal spending on 
fixed investment. For the cash flow and economic gain approaches, the magnitude of 
these differences depends on the type of investment. In some cases, spending on 
investment may be identified by the location of physical capital, as in the case of a new 
federal building in a certain region, where only local goods and services are used.  The 
location of the capital good determines the regional allocation of spending under both 
the cash-flow and economic gain approaches. In other cases, the direct connection to the 
location of the investment is not possible. Let us consider the installation of a new 
nuclear generating station built in region A and installed in region B. Under the cash 
flow approach the entire expenditure would be assigned to region B. Under the 
economic gain approach, the expenditures for the production of the nuclear generator 
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would be assigned to region A. Under the benefit approach, neither the location of the 
investment nor the place of production of a capital good are relevant.  
Interest on the federal debt is a federal cash payment to individuals and 
institutions holding government bonds. It is the price that taxpayers pay collectively for 
their unwillingness to finance federal spending entirely through domestic revenues. The 
goods and services provided through deficit financing are allocated among regions in 
the year the borrowing is incurred. The interest on the accumulated debt continues to be 
paid in future years through additional taxation. Yet, these payments are neither transfer 
payments nor payment for goods or services received. Two approaches to the treatment 
of this item may be used. Under one approach, the interest payments are included in the 
allocation in order to offset the taxes collected to pay them. Under a second approach, 
the redistributional effects of these payments are neutralized by excluding them from 
the calculation and making offsetting reductions on the revenue side.  
Under the first approach, one must address two questions: (a) what portion of 
these interest payments should be allocated to different regions, and (b) how should this 
amount be allocated? 
Government bonds may be held by domestic and foreign individuals and 
institutions. The interest paid to non-residents imposes a burden on domestic taxpayers 
because it must be paid through higher domestic taxation, but provides no 
corresponding income to residents. Therefore, this portion of the payment should be 
excluded from the calculation of federal balances. The excess of revenues over 
payments is implicitly allocated according to the regional distribution of federal 
revenues. The share of payments to non-residents may be approximated by the share of 
federal securities they hold.  
The interest on the federal debt assigned to residents may be allocated in three 
different ways. It may be treated as a transfer payment and allocated to the recipients of 
interest income by region. It may be related to the expenditures financed by borrowing 
and allocated in proportion to the regional distribution of federal program spending. Or 
it may be allocated in proportion to the regional distribution of federal tax revenues on 
grounds that borrowing allowed for lower tax rates. In my view, the first approach is 
more consistent with the treatment of other spending because, in the year when they are 
made, these payments are income received by the holders of the government bonds. 
Whichever method of allocation is used, including interest on the debt in the 
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calculations of federal balances and the revenues to finance it will generate some 
interregional redistribution determined exclusively by a methodological choice.  
The second approach neutralizes this potential redistribution by using the same 
regional distribution for revenues and expenditures. With the neutralizing procedure, the 
total amount of interest payments would remain unallocated on the spending side. The 
selected distribution of the interest payments to residents would then be deducted from 
the revenue side. This way, the domestic component would be excluded from the 
calculations in a manner that would affect both revenue and expenditures by the same 
amount. The interest payments to non-residents would be implicitly allocated according 
to the regional distribution of federal revenues.  
 
Treatment of surpluses and deficits 
Interregional redistribution measures the fiscal resources transferred among regions 
through federal intermediation. For a consistent measure of interregional redistribution, 
the allocated federal revenues must equal the allocated expenditures. The likelihood of 
this equality in a given year is quite low. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate options 
for the treatment of excess revenues (surpluses) or excess expenditures (deficits). 
Surplus. Governments rarely plan for budget surpluses, which may also result in 
surpluses on fiscal balances. Thus, one may assume that these surpluses are unplanned 
excesses of revenues over planned expenditures, caused by unforeseen economic 
developments affecting federal revenues. This excess revenue is not part of federal 
fiscal balances, but represents funds collected from all regions and not spent. Yet, it 
imposes a fiscal burden on all regions. In my view, this excess revenue should be placed 
in the income or consumption concept used to measure interregional redistribution 
because the surplus on federal balances reduces the level of income or consumption in 
each region. Therefore, the appropriate treatment of the surplus is to deduct the value 
allocated to various regions from the measure of income or consumption. If we treated 
this surplus as unplanned excess revenue, its regional allocation would be based on the 
regional distribution of federal tax revenues. 
Deficit. Conceptually, a deficit on federal balances is the flip side of a surplus. It 
should be recorded as an increase in income or potential consumption in the indicators 
of regional disparities. The main difference from the surplus situation is the method of 
its regional allocation. Whereas a surplus is usually unintended, deficits are often the 
result of deliberate plans to finance a portion of government spending with borrowed 
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funds. Therefore, one can allocate the deficit according to the regional distribution of 
federal revenues or federal expenditures. Since the deficit-financed goods and services 
are consumed or used immediately while the additional tax burden is shifted to future 
generations, the allocation according to federal expenditures may be more appropriate. 
 
Special issues 
Before turning to federal fiscal balances, I address briefly the following special issues: 
(a) the marginal cost of public funds, (b) expenditure externalities and consumption 
versus investment, (c) the interaction between federal and regional taxes, and (d) 
exporting of regional taxes. 
Marginal cost of public funds. Taxes tend to distort the decisions of private 
agents. General sales taxes and payroll taxes affect the choice between work and leisure; 
personal income taxes also affect the choice between work and leisure and additionally 
influence the choice between current consumption and saving and decisions about 
human capital acquisition; corporate taxes affect the location of business and investment 
decisions. If interregional redistribution requires higher levels of taxation, it imposes 
social costs in excess of the revenue raised, which are not captured by federal fiscal 
balances. For interregional redistribution, one must ask: does the extra federal taxation 
result in higher overall tax burdens in all regions? The answer depends on whether 
overall government spending is higher because of this redistribution.  
Expenditures externalities and consumption versus investment. The efficiency 
effects of taxation are paralleled by externalities on the spending side. There is 
increasing recognition that government spending generates social benefits in excess of 
the direct benefits gained by private agents. This is particularly true for government 
spending on education (Davies 2003), but it also applies to health care. Spending 
externalities have not received as much attention in the literature as the excess burden of 
taxation partly because they are viewed as consumption externalities, therefore, not 
wealth enhancing. This oversight results partly from the continuing practice in official 
statistics to treat all government expenditures, except fixed capital, as consumption. Yet, 
social scientists recognize at least five types of capital: physical, natural, human, social 
and civic (Helliwell 2002).  
Extending the concept of public investment beyond the purchase of fixed capital 
has important implications for the measurement of federal fiscal balances. The 
calculation of these balances does not distinguish among various components of federal 
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spending. Yet, a dollar spent on old age pension does not generate the same long-term 
economic effects as a dollar spent on education. As long as government investment 
involved only the purchase of physical capital, this approach was justifiable. If all 
government expenditures are consumption, they can be treated as economically 
equivalent regardless of where they are directed. When a large portion of government 
spending is investment, this equivalence can no longer be justified.   
Let us consider Canada. As a trade dependent country, Canada must pay 
attention to international competitiveness in terms of taxation and productivity. The 
federal government has placed great emphasis on both, by reducing corporate taxes and 
expanding its involvement in financing human capital and innovation. These measures 
may potentially widen regional economic disparities because large corporations, 
universities and research centres are mostly located in the larger and more prosperous 
provinces. This process is self-feeding through the interaction with provincial fiscal 
systems. If the economies of the richer provinces grow at a faster rate because of federal 
investment, their fiscal capacity will expand faster than the national average. The 
widening of fiscal disparities in combination with the expansion of employment 
opportunities in the richer provinces will stimulate interregional migration, which is in 
part fiscally-induced through the original impetus of regional imbalances in federal 
investment. 
If regional economic disparities are widened by federal spending policy, the 
degree of redistribution needed to maintain existing disparities of living standards will 
increase automatically, and this increased regional redistribution will be recorded in 
federal fiscal balances. The factors that caused this increase, however, remain 
unexposed. The policy discussions will focus on the increased federal transfers and the 
blame will be placed on the political leaders in the less affluent provinces for their 
alleged failures to implement growth enhancing policies. Policy prescriptions will likely 
include calls for changes in federal transfers to reduce the dependency of the less 
affluent provinces rather than a rebalancing of federal spending policies.  
Interaction between federal and regional tax systems. In some federations, 
federal and regional governments share a variety of tax bases, a situation that facilitates 
interactions between their respective tax systems. Let us consider provincial payroll 
taxes that are deductible from federal business income taxes. For the regions that levy 
those taxes, their deductibility is recorded as a reduction in the contribution made by 
those provinces to the federal coffers. If the federal government raises its tax rates in 
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order to replace the lost revenues, this burden will be shared by all regions. The workers 
in the regions with the deductible payroll taxes will gain because part of their tax burden 
has been exported to other regions through higher federal taxation. The changes in 
federal revenues are captured by federal fiscal balances, the changes in economic 
activity by province are captured by measures of interregional redistribution, but the 
changes in the revenues raised by the tax-importing regions will remain unaccounted. 
Exporting regional taxes. When taxes are shifted backward or forward, part of 
their burden may fall on economic agents that reside outside the jurisdiction where they 
are imposed. Tax exporting may be limited when a regional tax is shifted to labour and 
interregional migration of labour is extremely sensitive to small changes in after-tax 
wages. Tax exporting is more likely to occur when the tax is shifted backward to capital 
income or forward to consumers, because in those cases the taxpayers cannot escape the 
tax burden through migration. Interregional tax exporting is not captured by federal 
fiscal balances. It could be captured in the measure of income used in the calculation of 
interregional redistribution, but the effort to include this refinement may not be fruitful 
for two reasons. First, the magnitude of this effect depends largely on interregional 
differentials in tax structures and tax levels. Second, it would be very difficult to 
measure these effects accurately.    
There may also be spillovers of regional expenditures financed partly by federal 
grants. In a federation, the high degree of mobility of labour and capital among regions 
facilitates interregional spillovers of the effects of public spending. Thus, over the long-
run, the gains for a region recorded in annual federal fiscal balances may be spread to 
other regions. In Canada, the less affluent provinces receive equalization payments from 
the federal government to raise their per capita fiscal capacity. A portion of this 
unconditional federal transfer is spent on education. Post-secondary education receives 
an additional federal subsidy in all provinces. Given the different imbalances in 
provincial labour markets, there is a high degree of interprovincial migration as 
educated young workers migrate from the less affluent to the more affluent provinces in 
search of higher wages and better careers. Annual federal fiscal balances include the 
federal transfers to the less affluent provinces in their entirety. In subsequent years, they 
include the additional federal revenues from higher economic activity in the more 
prosperous provinces. The resulting widening of regional economic disparities would be 
captured by indices of interregional redistribution based on comprehensive income 
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measures. The increased fiscal capacity in the more prosperous provinces is not 
recorded in any of these measures.  
The special issues identified in this subsection can potentially affect the 
calculation and interpretation of federal fiscal balances, but their impact is difficult to 
measure. These issues provide fruitful areas for future research on fiscal federalism and 
interregional redistribution. 
 
Federal fiscal balances 
The difference between federal expenditures allocated to a region and federal revenues 
assigned to it are called federal fiscal balances and indicate the gain or loss to a region 
from federal fiscal activity. In a federation, these balances do not measure the gains or 
losses of being part of a federal system because the federal government can influence 
the economic conditions in different regions through non-fiscal instruments. 
In the presentation of the results, the estimated federal balances may be divided 
by a region’s population to provide a quick comparison of how much the economic 
position of the average resident was affected by federal spending and revenue-raising 
activities. Expressed as a percentage of a measure of economic performance, they 
provide a rough indication of their quantitative significance with respect to a region’s 
economy. Any presentation other than the level of these balances by region is a step 
towards an interregional redistribution interpretation, a task that requires a more detailed 
discussion.  
 
3. The income concept 
 
To measure the redistributional impact of the federal fiscal system we need to relate 
federal fiscal balances to a suitable measure of regional income or consumption. For this 
measure we need to estimate its actual value and a selected counterfactual value.  
The measure of regional economic disparities used for analyzing interregional 
redistribution must be consistent with the selected approach for measuring federal fiscal 
balances. For the benefit approach, it is more appropriate to use a consumption measure, 
as this approach focuses on the federal tax burden borne by individuals in a certain 
region and the benefits they receive from federal spending. For the economic gain 
approach, an income measure is more appropriate as it focuses on the federal tax burden 
borne collectively by the residents of a region and the factor income generated in that 
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region by federal spending. Although the cash-flow approach is not linked to a specific 
concept of regional economic disparities, on the spending side it is closer to the 
economic gain approach. Therefore, an income measure may be more appropriate than a 
consumption measure. 
As shown in Ruggeri (2008) in this volume, a suitable income measure includes 
three main components. Here I identify its main elements. The first component is the 
sum of all earnings by private sector agents, which may be called unadjusted private 
income. The second component includes a number of adjustments made primarily 
because of the backward shifting of certain taxes and the inclusion of private pensions. 
The third component includes the fiscal balances. In this respect, a choice must be made 
on which balances to include. If regional redistribution is based on the overall economic 
position of the average resident in each region, then we need to include the fiscal 
balances of all governments. If, instead, we focus on the redistribution generated by the 
federal fiscal activity alone, we need to include only the federal balances. In my view, 
the second option is preferable for the following reasons. First, it allows comparisons 
for more than one year that are unaffected by changes in regional and local balances. 
Second, because of the potential for tax exporting and expenditure spillovers, regional 
balances, if not local ones, should be calculated by using the same methodology as that 
for federal balances. This effort may be justified only when existing fiscal arrangements 
allow for direct redistribution among regions without federal intermediation.  
Private income plus federal or total government balances yields the income that 
is used as the base for the redistributional calculations (base income). The 
counterfactual may be selected by making reference to the approach used in fiscal 
incidence studies. As suggested by Ruggeri, van Wart and Howard (1997), a meaningful 
counterfactual is the distribution of income in the presence of government activity that 
is distributionally neutral. Similarly, for interregional redistribution, the appropriate 
counterfactual is an inter-regionally neutral federal fiscal system, which occurs when 
federal revenues and expenditures are allocated among different regions in proportion to 
their private income. This counterfactual income is called neutral-fisc income. When we 
adjust for surpluses or deficits of allocated balances, the total amount of federal 
revenues is equal to the total amount of federal expenditures, federal fiscal balances are 
zero in each region, and neutral-fisc income is equal to private income. Finally, both 
base income and neutral-fisc income are expressed in per capita values in order to adjust 
for different population levels among regions. Base income may be estimated for the 
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entire federal fiscal system or for selected components. To determine the 
redistributional impact of any selected component, base income is calculated by using 
the allocated value of that component alone and comparing it to the unchanging neutral-
fisc income.  
 
4. Indices of interregional redistribution 
 
The measurement of interregional redistribution differs from the measurement of fiscal 
redistribution by replacing the average member of an income group with the average 
member of an entire region. There are two main types of indices of interregional 
redistribution: (a) indices based exclusively on federal fiscal balances, and (b) indices 
based on selected measures of income or consumption. For each main type we can 
distinguish local from global indices. 
 
Indices including only federal fiscal balances 
Local Indices. The simplest local index is the per capita value of the federal fiscal 
balances by region. These values provide an indication of the average gain by the 
residents of the gaining regions and the average contribution by the residents of the 
contributing regions. On a graph that lists regions in ascending order of per capita 
income on the horizontal axis and per capita gains or contributions on the vertical axis, a 
neutral federal fisc under a balanced budget (zero federal fiscal balances for all regions) 
would be represented by a horizontal line at the origin. Interregional redistribution 
would be indicated by per capita gains and contributions lined up along a line sloping 
downward from left to right. The steeper the slope of this line, the greater would be the 
degree of redistribution.   
Global Indices. A global indicator in this class would be the total gain by all the 
receiving regions divided by the total population of the contributing provinces. This 
ratio indicates the burden that the average resident of all contributing regions bears to 
finance the level of federal interregional redistribution in a given year. 
These two indices provide information on which regions gained most and which 
regions contributed most. They provide no information on the factors determining this 
outcome. The main determining factor behind interregional redistribution is the 
existence of regional differences in economic performance and fiscal capacity. Indices 
that consider these two factors are discussed next.  
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 Indices based on income or consumption 
Local Indices. A local indicator of interregional redistribution may be developed by 
comparing per capita base income and per capita neutral-fisc income, following 
Bayoumi and Masson [1995] who regressed a region’s share of base income against its 
share of neutral fisc income.  
 For each region i, this local index (Id) is: 
 
 (1) Idi = [(ybi/yb)/(yni/yn] 
 
where yb is per capita base income, and yn is per capita neutral-fisc income. 
 
By transposing terms, expression (1) becomes 
 
 (2) Idi = [(ybi/yni)/(yb/yn)] 
 
Since in each ratio the population is the same at the numerator and the denominator, 
expression (2) can be expressed in aggregate values, indicated by capital letters. 
 
 (3) Idi = [(Ybi/Yni)/(Yb/Yn) 
 
When allocated federal revenues and expenditures are equal, the disaggregated index is 
reduced to the first ratio in (3). The numerator and the denominator of this ratio differ 
by the difference between actual and redistributionally neutral federal balances. This 
local index, therefore, measure a region’s gain or loss from federal fiscal activity as a 
percent of its own neutral-fisc income. 
When federal surpluses or deficits are neutralized and regional plus local 
balances are excluded, expression (3) is reduced to 
 
 (4) Idi = 1 + (Bi/Yni) 
 
Mansell and Schlecter (1995) used a variation of this indicator. The relative share of 
federal fiscal balances assigned to region i is 
 
 (5) RSi = [(ri/r)]/[ei/e)]/(yni/yn)] 
 
where r and e are per capita federal revenues and expenditures allocated by region.  
Since the population levels are the same for each of the regional and national 
variables, (5) can be expressed in total amounts of allocated  federal revenues  (R) and 
expenditures (E), with transposition of terms, as: 
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 (6) RSi = [(Ri/Ei)/(E/R)]/(yni/yn) 
 
The degree of interregional redistribution may be estimated by comparing the actual RSi 
in (6) with their values under a neutral allocation of federal fiscal balances, namely, 
federal balances allocated in proportion to neutral-fisc income. Ruggeri and Yu [2003] 
have shown that these neutral-fisc relative shares – RSi(N) – may be expressed as: 
 
 (7) RSi(N) = y/yi 
 
which means that they are the reciprocal of relative regional income disparities.  
Ruggeri and Yu (2003) developed separate local indices based on these relative 
shares  to address the following questions: (1) does the current regional distributions of 
federal revenues and expenditures generate more or less redistribution than the case 
where revenues are distributionally neutral among provinces and expenditures are 
allocated on an equal per capita basis (standard redistribution)? (2) What proportion of 
maximum redistribution, which would equalize post-fisc income in all regions, is 
generated by the regional distribution of federal revenues and expenditures? 
To address these two questions, the authors start with expressions (5) and (6) 
and develop four sets of relative shares of federal fiscal balances: the actual relative 
shares – RSi(A) -, the neutral relative shares – RSi(N) -, the standard redistribution 
relative shares – RSi(S) -, and the maximum redistribution shares – RSi(M). 
The relative share index for the standard interregional redistribution – RSIi(S) – 
is: 
 
 (8) RSIi(S) = [RSi(A) – RSi(N)]/[RSi(S) – RSi(N)] 
 
which can be transformed into 
 
 (9) RSIi(S) = [(Ri – Ei)/Ei]/[(yi –y)/y] 
 
When RSIi(S) equals 0, there is no interregional redistribution ; when it equals 1, the 
federal fiscal system generates the standard interregional redistribution; values greater 
(less) than 1 indicate higher (lower) interregional distribution than the standard case. 
The relative share index with respect to maximum redistribution – RSIi(M) - is: 
 
 (10) RSIi(M) = [RSi(A) – RSi(N)]/[RSi(M) – RSi(N)] 
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The lower and upper limits of this local index are 0 and 1. This means that the estimated 
value of RSIi(M) measures the proportion of maximum redistribution (equal after-
federal-fisc per capita income in all regions) generated by the current regional 
distribution of federal revenues and expenditures. 
Global indices. These indices present a single indicator of interregional 
redistribution and are derived by comparing the overall degree of inequality under base 
income and neutral-fisc income. If we use the Gini coefficient (G) as the aggregate 
measure of per capita income inequality among regions, we can derive an aggregate 
index of interregional redistribution as 
 
 (11) Ia = Gn – Gb 
 
where n refers to neutral-fisc income and b to base income. 
When federal fiscal activity redistributes income from higher to lower income 
regions, actual base income is distributed less unequally than neutral-fisc income, Gn is 
higher than Gb and Ia has a positive value. The higher is this difference, the higher is the 
degree of interregional redistribution. Cassady, Ruggeri and Van Wart (1996) have 
shown that this index is equivalent to the index of vertical redistribution for fiscal 
incidence developed by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977). 
For fiscal redistribution, Pechman and Okner (1980) suggested an aggregate 
index based on the proportional change in the two Gini coefficients. Using this measure 
yields the aggregate index: 
 
 (12) Ia* = (Gn – Gb)/Gn 
 
Following Bayoumi and Masson (1995) we can develop a global index by relating the 
per capita values of base income in each region to the corresponding per capita value of 
neutral-fisc income 
 
 (13) ybi/yb = a + m(yni/yn) + ui 
 
where ui refers to the error term. 
The estimate of (1 – m) measures the average proportion of the regional 
deviation in per capita neutral-fisc income that is offset by federal spending and 
revenue-raising activities. 
Global indices may also be developed for the local relative share indices 
following the aggregation approach used by Cassady, Ruggeri and Van Wart (1996) in 
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the development of global indices from the local indices of tax progressivity proposed 
by Baum (1987). For interregional redistribution, the global indices can be calculated as 
the weighted average of the local indices where the weights are the regional shares of 




This paper discussed the major methodological issues in the measurement of federal 
fiscal flows in a federation and the estimation of local and global indices of 
interregional redistribution. It identified three fundamental steps in this process: (a) the 
assumptions about the regional allocation of federal government revenues and 
expenditures; (b) the selection of appropriate income or consumption concepts for 
measuring the redistributional effect of federal fiscal activity; and (c) the selection and 
application of the appropriate measures of interregional redistribution. 
There is little to be debated about the measure of regional economic disparities. 
The choice between consumption and income measures cannot be arbitrary, but must be 
consistent with the approach selected to measure federal fiscal balances. There is also 
little to be debated about the indices of redistribution. They must measure the extent to 
which federal fiscal activity has reduced the degree of regional disparities in the 
selected economic indicator. We need to distinguish between local and global indices, 
but estimates of both should be included in the presentation of the results to determine 
not only the overall degree of interregional redistribution, but also its interregional 
equity dimensions. 
There is room for debate with respect to the selection of the appropriate 
approach to the measurement of federal fiscal balances. Even in this area, it must be 
acknowledged that all three available approaches – cash-flow, benefit, and economic 
gain – yield the same regional allocation for a large portion of federal revenues (those 
not subject to shifting) and for a large portion of federal expenditures (transfers to 
persons and transfers to other governments). It seems to me that developing an approach 
that would receive broad acceptance should not be a daunting methodological task. The 
compromise between cash-flow and benefit approaches incorporated into the economic 
gain approach may be a useful starting point. 
There are two potentially more controversial areas that require more research. 
The first area includes a variety of issues directly related to the calculation and 
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interpretation of federal fiscal balances. These balances are calculated within a static 
framework. Yet, it is known that federal fiscal policy may have long term effects on 
national economic performance and regional economic disparities. These effects are not 
captured by annual estimates of federal fiscal balances, even when estimates are 
provided on a frequent basis. To fully understand the regional impacts of federal fiscal 
policy the analysis must be placed within a dynamic framework, which takes into 
account the positive and negative effects of federal fiscal actions on regional economic 
and fiscal disparities. It is also important to investigate the effect of fiscal federalism on 
overall levels of government spending and taxation, the implications of tax exporting 
within a country, and the spillovers from spending by regional governments. Also, it 
may useful to explore whether federal purchases of goods and services have a different 
effect on a region’s economy than transfers to persons. 
Finally, it is important to investigate the extent to which non-fiscal actions by 
the federal government affect regional economic and fiscal disparities. If non-fiscal 
activity widens regional economic disparities by 10 percent and federal fiscal actions 
reduce them by 10 percent, no redistribution is generated by the federal government 
although estimates of federal fiscal balances would indicate some redistribution. 
The institutions and instruments of fiscal federalism are affected by both 
economic and political forces. The quality of the debate on these issues can be improved 
by developing consistent methodologies and measurement tools that help shift the 
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